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From its very beginning the European Union has had a strong interest in the 
maintenance of peace, stability and good neighbourly relations in the Medi-
terranean region. And for good reason too: many of the member states of 
the EU have a long Mediterranean coast line (France, Greece, Italy and 
Spain) as well as long-standing historic ties with the countries of the Medi-
terranean region. The region is an important outlet for EU exports particu-
larly not least for the northern member states.1 Furthermore, the Mediterra-
nean region has developed into a strategically important conduit for the 
supply of a substantial part of the Union’s oil and petroleum needs as well 
as a major world maritime highway for the carriage of goods and oil.2 Envi-
ronmental degradation has a direct bearing on all states of region, not least 
 
1 In 1999, exports by the EU 15 to the Mediterranean Basin countries amounted to 
87.8 billion Euros (11.6%) of total extra-EU exports of the EU, while imports a-
mounted to 63 billion Euros (8.2%) of all extra-EU imports. In 1999, the main EU 
exporters to the Mediterranean Basin countries were Germany - 22%, France 20% 
and Italy 18%. Source: Eurostatistics, Data for Short-Term Economic Analysis. 
Theme 1, General Statistics, (Monthly), European Commission. 
2 It is estimated that 30% of total merchant shipping in the world and 20% of oil 
shipping cross the Mediterranean each year. See, "State and Pressures of the Ma-
rine Coastal Mediterranean Environment", European Environment Agency and 
UNEP, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1999, pages 
66-70. 
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among them the key EU member states.3 A serious maritime disaster in this 
comparatively narrow sea4 could have immediate negative economic ef-
fects on all states particularly those that have been expanding their income 
and employment from tourism. On the other hand, the expansion of the tou-
rist sector is also increasing the environmental pressures in the region.5 
Sluggish economic growth when combined with rapid demographic growth 
as in some of the key southern littoral countries could also increase migra-
tory pressures on Europe. In sum, negative developments in the Mediterra-
nean region do not only affect the states of the region themselves, but they 
can also spillover onto the Union itself, sometimes with a knock on effect 
as well. This fact has long been recognised by the Union. 
The Union’s response has been a series of polices, beginning with the Glo-
bal Mediterranean Policy of the early 1970s and culminating in the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership, the so-called Barcelona Process, which began 
in 1995, in which the EU, acting as a civilian power, has sought to help 
stabilise the region. These policies have periodically been criticised for 
being inadequate. Their main aim is undoubtedly the Union’s own in-
terests. However, a broad assessment of the effects on the Mediterranean 
Basin countries reveals that indeed the policy has been instrumental in at 
least preserving the traditional trade outlets and market access for the 
southern littoral states and with laying the foundations for newer forms of 
co-operation across the region. The positive effects of this overlaying cob-
web of relations are already being felt and could possibly intensify in the 
 
3 See for example the Dobris Assessment on the Mediterranean: Stanners D., and 
Bordeau P., (eds.) "Europe's Environment: The Dobris Assessment", European En-
vironment Agency, Copenhagen, 1995,pages 116-121 
4 On average there are 60 maritime accidents per annum in the Mediterranean region, 
with about 15 involving ships causing oil and chemical spills. [ibid., op.cit., UNEP 
and EEA 1999, page 66]. According to the second assessment of Europe's Envi-
ronment, carried out by the European Environmental Agency, there are about 40 oil 
related sites in the Mediterranean region (pipeline terminals, refineries, off-shore 
platforms etc) and an estimated 0.55 and 0.15 billion tonnes of crude oil and petroe-
lum products respectively are loaded and unloaded every year. See "Europe's Envi-
ronment: The Second Assessment", European Environment Agency, Office for Of-
ficial Publications of the European Communities, 1998, page 220. 
5 For a discussion of the environmental effects of tourism on the region, ibid., pages 
49-52. 
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future, if the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is more successful. Lastly, 
the effects of the EU’s Mediterranean policies had best be judged by refer-
ence to the anti-monde situation of the absence of such policies. In other 
words, would the countries of the Mediterranean Basin have been better or 
worse off without the EU’s intervention in the region, defective as the latter 
may be?  
It is to the EU's credit that it has not been myopic to the need of constantly 
reviewing its Mediterranean policy. The 1972 Global Mediterranean Policy 
(GMP) was an attempt to bring some order under a global approach to the 
plethora of agreements that the Community had been concluding with the 
non-member states of the region since the Athens Association Agreement 
of 1961. Following nearly two decades of the GMP, the „new approach“ 
originally announced in 1989, attempted to review the Mediterranean pol-
icy in the light of the second EC enlargement that saw the inclusion of 
Greece, Spain and Portugal in the Community. This enlargement was per-
ceived by the non-member states as having eroded their preferences in the 
EU. This review was accelerated by developments in central and eastern 
Europe and the Community’s need to restore ‘balance’ in its external rela-
tions, so as not to appear to be tilting too much away from the Mediterra-
nean region and towards its new found partners in the East. Finally, in Sep-
tember of this year, the European Commission published new proposals on 
how the Mediterranean Partnership could be strengthened in the coming 
years.6 
Another interesting and related process is the EU enlargement and particu-
larly the future accession of Cyprus and Malta, which can occur in the 
short-term, and in the longer run Turkey. From this point onwards, this pa-
per focuses on the possible impact of the accession of Cyprus and Malta in 
the EU on the Mediterranean Partnership. 
 
6 „Reinvigorating the Barcelona Process“, Com (00) 497 final, Brussels, 06/09/2000 
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Enlargement 
The EU's enlargement has an external and internal aspect. On the external 
front, the EU's major trading partners, including those of the Mediterranean 
Basin, stand to benefit from a larger single market operating on common 
rules as well as new investment and trading opportunities.7 Provided, of 
course, that matching national policies are pursued which help partner 
countries realise the opportunities that open up. The accession of Cyprus 
and Malta in the EU also has an internal as well as an external dimension 
from the EU's stand point. Externally, their accession will further extend 
the EU's borders southwards in the region. Internally, the Mediterranean 
group within the EU - presently composed of five member states, namely 
Spain and Portugal (even if the latter has only an Atlantic coastline), Fran-
ce, Italy and Greece will increase to seven. However, although the number 
of EU Mediterranean countries will increase through the entry of Cyprus 
and Malta, the internal balance in the Union more towards central and eas-
tern Europe. This should not necessarily give cause of concern. When due 
consideration is given to the growing interdependence of the various mem-
ber-states of the Union, as well the broader interests of all member states, 
which are bound to intensify as economic integration deepens and widens, 
then it becomes more worthwhile to consider the EU as a single system 
where any change in one of the parts affects the whole and hence is in eve-
ry member state’s interest. The knock-on effect or shock waves across an 
integrated single system such as the EU has become, means that the 
Mediterranean for example, is not a region that should concern only the 
Mediterranean EU member states, in the same way as central and eastern 
Europe should not be the concern of the states of that sub-region only.8 In 
addition, consideration must also be given to the fact that the Union is go-
verned by common institutions where the formal equality of all member 
 
7 European Commission, Strategy Paper on Enlargement, November 8, 2000. 
8 It is axiomatic to think on the basis of integration theory that any serious distur-
bance in any one of these regions will be quickly transmitted to the whole of the 
system, while the adverse effects caused will depend of course on the magnitude of 
the impulse. By the same logic, the beneficial effects of the EU's enlargement stand 
to benefit all countries with strong links with the Union. 
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all member states is not only accepted but enables them to participate in all 
the decisions that are on the agenda.  
However, proximity will continue to play an important role no doubt (e.g. 
Germany taking the lead in central and eastern Europe, France, Italy, Spain, 
Greece and Portugal in the Mediterranean region, Italy in the Balkans etc) 
in shaping the Union’s policies towards third countries. Hence, the division 
of the EU member states into real or imaginary 'clubs' or caucuses remains 
useful for the purpose of analysis, though it must not be treated as a unique 
explanatory variable. 
In light of the above discussion, the entry of Cyprus and Malta in the EU, 
may indeed strengthen the sensitivity of the Union towards the Mediterra-
nean region. The cause of this increased sensitivity derives from two main 
aspects: the small size of the two prospective member states and the fact 
that they are only two wholly Mediterranean states with little other compet-
ing interests apart from the Mediterranean region. By virtue of their small 
size and limited resources, their attention and contribution in the decision-
making institutions of the Union has to be more focused. This 'Mediterra-
nean orientation' is best brought out by this comparison: while the larger 
European Mediterranean states have multiple foreign policy interests, apart 
from what is happening in the Mediterranean region (e.g. the larger EU 
member states are all in one way or the other involved simultaneously in 
developments in the Balkans, Central and eastern Europe and trans-Atlantic 
relations to mention a few) and which divide their attention in international 
relations, the main concerns of Cyprus and Malta and which flow mainly 
from their smallness and vulnerability, are more focused on the matters of 
immediate relevance to them, which begin in the Mediterranean region, if 
not the sub-region of the Mediterranean to which they belong.9 Their small 
size and their sense of insularity, makes them more sensitive to whatever 
happens in the region than most other states.  
 
9 The argument used here with respect to the European states can be used with equal 
force to the 'multiple' foreign policy interests of the Arab states of the region: e.g. 
Arab politics, African politics etc. 
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In addition, it must be emphasised that Cyprus and Malta are not only is-
land states but also the only ones with no physical link with any of the lar-
ger continents (Europe, Africa or Asia) surrounding the Mediterranean. 
Hence their 'Mediterranean orientation' tends to be stronger (although they 
are not totally focused in this direction only). The attitude of the Mediterra-
nean states could perhaps be illustrated by reference to Malta’s first policy 
statement when it joined the Council of Europe in 1965. Addressing the 
Parliamentary Assembly in 1965, Malta's Prime Minister expressed it this 
way: "Membership of the Council of Europe has been to my country like 
returning home after a long absence…Whilst a European country sharing a 
common culture, history and way of life, we naturally gravitate towards 
Europe, our geographical position makes us aware of the importance of 
North Africa, which shares, with six members of the Council, a common 
sea and which has much to contribute to the welfare of the area. We there-
fore would think of this aspect of European foreign policy could be given 
some more thought."10 From that point onwards, Malta’s foreign policy 
emphasis has varied from more to less intense preoccupation with the Me-
diterranean region. 
Consider for example the two states' income from tourism, which amounts 
to around 20% of GDP in the case of Cyprus and 22% of GDP in the case 
of Malta. A serious political disturbance in the region and its environs or a 
maritime ecological disaster close to their coasts, could negatively affect 
their economic well-being. The outbreak of the Gulf War in 1990-91 has 
supplied ample evidence of how travel and trade in and across the region 
could be negatively affected by a serious disturbance, even on the region's 
periphery.11 Furthermore, while every Mediterranean Basin country reaps 
 
10 Malta Today, Department of Information, Malta, September 1965, pages 5-9. 
11 The Bulletin published by the Central Bank of Cyprus in June 1991 (No 111, page 
1), had this to say: "Economic activity during the first quarter of 1991 suffered a 
severe blow from the eruption of the Gulf war…Tourism and related activities, 
which are highly vulnerable under conditions of political and military turmoil, ex-
perienced substantial losses arising from a greatly reduced tourist inflow. The set-
back…was enhanced by an expansion of the trade deficit… (resulting) from re-
duced foreign demand for manufactured goods , particularly in the Arab countries 
and the Middle East…"  
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economic dividends from peace and stability, small and economically 
'open' countries such as Cyprus and Malta stand to gain more and risk los-
ing most in the event of turmoil. Indeed the independence of small and 
weak states tends to be most at risk in times of conflict.  
However, being small states, both Cyprus and Malta have a different ap-
proach to their Mediterranean agenda than the larger countries. The inde-
pendence and identity of small states is probably more at risk in an anarchi-
cal international or regional states system, and particularly in times of war, 
than in a "rule-based" one. That is why, small states such as Cyprus and 
Malta are more inclined than larger states to support and uphold interna-
tional organisations and to act through them in concert with others. Indeed, 
both countries have placed special importance on international organisa-
tions and multilateral negotiations where they have initiated their most no-
te-worthy foreign policy actions since their independence. The Euro-
Mediterranean partnership is a rule-based international regime that suits 
these two countries' aims and methods in the region to near perfection: the 
partnership facilitates the achievement of more open trade, eventually a 
Euro-Mediterranean free trade area, it strengthens the links of interdepend-
ence among the region's states, it gives both Cyprus and Malta a freer ac-
cess to the North African and Near Eastern markets, it provides a political 
forum for the discussion of some key regional political issues, strengthens 
confidence-building measures and multiplies the horizontal and vertical 
links of co-operation across the region and keeps both sides of the Mediter-
ranean Basin positively engaged in search of common solutions. In the last 
analysis the partnership is a factor of stability for which there is no alterna-
tive substitute in sight. Furthermore, while the larger EU states can con-
template a national approach to the region in parallel with the EU's unified 
policy, Cyprus and Malta can only act effectively if they do so through a 
larger and more effective policy such as the EU's Euro-Mediterranean Pol-
 
The Economic Survey January-September 1991 (Ministry of Economic Affairs 
Malta): (page 23) "One of the main factors behind this development (slow down in 
foreign demand) is the slowdown observed in the export of services, particularly 
tourism, associated with the adverse repercussions of the Gulf crisis on the econ-
omy during the first part of the year." 
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icy. As a result the importance that the two small states attach to the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership will always tend to be different from that at-
tached by the larger EU member states. 
It is also likely that the importance and international standing of both Cy-
prus and Malta will increase in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership by vir-
tue of their EU membership alone, and particularly by the fact that they be-
come direct participants in the formulation and execution of the EU poli-
cies. What remains to be seen is how they will use this new found impor-
tance. Furthermore, by virtue of the fact that both island states are Com-
monwealth countries, they also have long standing relations with the coun-
tries linked to the EU by the Lom‚ Convention, apart from links with Can-
ada, Australia, New Zealand and India to mention a few. These relations 
can also become useful to the European Union. 
The question still remains, however, as to what possible role could Cyprus 
and Malta play in the Mediterranean region following enlargement. To be-
gin with, it is worth observing that for a long time, Cyprus and Malta were 
members of the non-aligned Movement. Cyprus was one of the founding 
members of the Movement, Malta defined its neutrality, enshrined in the 
Constitution by reference to non-alignment. Although the non-aligned mo-
vement was neither a paradigm of unity (several of its members went to 
war against one another) nor of impeccable correct international behaviour, 
Kissinger accused members of the movement of exploiting East-West ri-
valry, nevertheless it served as a platform for dialogue between a number 
of countries, including practically all those of the southern Mediterranean 
littoral. The small size of Cyprus and Malta, coupled with their past in-
volvement in the non-aligned Movement and the fact that they neither have 
the means to project power (they do not present a ‘security dilemma’ to 
their neighbours) nor broader ambitions, makes them ideal for the role of 
political ‘brokers’ in the region. The two countries have already had the 
opportunity to play this role during the Conference on Security and Co-
operation in Europe together with the other members of the group of Euro-
pean Neutral and Non-aligned countries (N + N). As EU members Malta 
and Cyprus will be represented in the EU decision-making institutions 
while enjoying at the same time the trust of their neighbours. 
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This does not mean that Malta and Cyprus will become the only diplomatic 
bridges between the southern and northern shores of the Mediterranean Ba-
sin. Cyprus and Malta will still lack the means, diplomatic resources and 
prestige to make meaningful interventions in major problems (such as the 
Middle East, Algeria etc..) But their role could become useful in the event 
of lesser problems that appear difficult to resolve and in lobbying inside the 
EU institutions in favour of Mediterranean initiatives by the EU. Taking 
their CSCE experience as a starting point, Cyprus and Malta could perhaps 
play the role of messengers, intermediaries, „mellowers“, initiators of third 
solutions, providers of a constructive push in times of stalemate and pro-
viders of good offices.12 A lot will also depend on their role in the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy of the EU (CFSP) and the level of prestige 
they manage to build up in this EU pillar. Both applicant states claim to be 
ready to take on the CFSP acquis. Participation in the so called Petersberg 
tasks which are consonant with the preferred policies of neutral and non-
aligned states will also increase their ability to play the roles described 
above. However, as long as they remain out of the EU, they can never mus-
ter the importance in international affairs or in the EU institutions them-
selves to be in a position to play such a role. 
Conclusion 
The accession of Cyprus and Malta in the EU does not threaten the Union 
with insurmountable problems and nor is it likely to negatively affect the 
EU’s partners in the Mediterranean region. Their entry will also increase 
the Mediterranean group of states in the Union, but does not threaten the 
overall balance of the Union. As small states they may be regarded as help-
less in advancing their international agenda. However, they also possess 
strengths which derive from their smallness. Hence, their stronger focus on 
their immediate environment, the Mediterranean, and a limited foreign rela-
tions agenda, the lack of broader distractions, coupled with their friendly 
 
12 This is the role that the N+N group played in the CSCE according to Anton Bebler 
in „The NN Group in the New European Security Architecture“, The International 
Spectator, IAI, Rome, Volume XXVII, No 1, January-March, 1992, page 72. 
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relations with neighbouring countries, the fact that both applicants have a 
recent colonial experience (having suffered hegemony, not exercised it) 
which they share with their neighbours, their experience in the non-aligned 
movement and the experience of their participation in the CSCE, all help 
them to take on a very positive role in the EU and in the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership. It may also be argued convincingly, that Cyp-
riot and Maltese EU membership will benefit more the southern Mediterra-
nean non-member states in dealing with the EU, than if the two small ap-
plicant island states stay out. The dynamics of the next Mediterranean en-
largement of the EU to include Cyprus and Malta exhibit a few noteable 
advantages as argued in this paper that are significant, despite the small si-
ze of these applicants. 
 
 
